

TsAMO, f. 500, op. 12462, d. 525, l. 84–85. Translation from him.

**15. Report of the headquarters of the 4th Panzer Army to the  
command of Army Group Center[196]  
9.2.1942**

***4th Panzer Army Operations Department, No. 517/42***

Army Group Center  
SECRET

The front built to guard the city of Vyazma, and the motorway and railway to the west of Vyazma, which is almost entirely in contact with the enemy, is currently about 120 km. Here at the disposal of the tank army, in addition to convoy units,  
available:

9 partly very weak infantry and rifle battalions, 5 security battalions with some heavy guns and small, partly immobile artillery. Two ski battalions are being marched here. In contrast, the following enemy forces have so far been noted:

In the north: Gorin's group [197] consisting of the 18th, 24th and 82nd cavalry, 107th motorized divisions. The latter even has 7 tanks [at] 52 tons, [198] which are currently —  
motionless due to lack of fuel. In the south  
and southeast:

8 parachute brigade[199] consisting of four battalions. 1st  
Guards Cavalry Corps (Belov) with 1st, 2nd Guards Cavalry Divisions, 57th, 41st Cavalry Divisions and, possibly, according to agent reports, another 2nd Guards Tank Brigade, the main units of the 338th, 113th, 329th rifle divisions and the rear of the 160th division, 250th airborne regiment. In addition, there are uncontrolled groups of partisans.

With a rough estimate, the infantry strength of these formations should be about 12,000 people. Compared to this, the strength of our infantry formations (excluding transport units) is 7,000 people.

This numerical balance of forces is unfavorable for us. Russian forces are much more mobile in winter conditions and have excellent signalmen and scouts, who very quickly orientate themselves in their country and inform about our slowly carried out troop movements. This shortcoming cannot be fully compensated for by the fact that the Russians have very little

artillery. But despite this, it is possible that individual enemy groupings will be defeated one after another. To do this, however, it is necessary to prevent the Russians from transferring new forces and supplying them by air and land. According to repeated reports so far available, the Russians, mainly by air (landing) in the area around Luga, as well as by land transport through Bogoroditskaya, are constantly being reinforced by people and, presumably, various materiel.

The 4th Panzer Army, with its own forces, is not in a position to nip this influx in the bud, since both supply bases are far beyond its sector.

Therefore, it should be strongly demanded that the army take over this task as soon as possible. On the other hand, sufficient protection of the area around Vyazma is called into question, and the final cleansing of this area is generally impossible.

Signed by ***Ruof***

TsAMO, f. 500, op. 12 479. file 1335.

**16. Report of the commander of Army Group Center to the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces on the need to take measures to combat partisans, enemy units and formations in the rear of the army group** [200] —  
**No. 1430/42**

Sov. secret, for command only **24**  
**February 1942**

The constant strengthening of enemy units in the rear of the front of the army group and the growth of the partisan movement associated with this in the entire rear area are taking on such an ominous volume that I

great seriousness should indicate this danger. In order to establish[201] it in a timely manner, immediate measures are needed with the involvement of large forces. Radical cleaning is possible only in winter (until about mid-March). After that, enemy formations and partisans will have better conditions for the existence and conduct of hostilities, so that the fight against them will become much more difficult, and in part it will be completely impossible. The hope that they will not survive the "thaw period" due to poor supplies is erroneous, since the enemy is most often located in areas that are most economically rich. Throughout the summer, he will create a constant threat to the entire area of the army group. If earlier the activity of the partisans was limited to the disruption of rear communications, attacks on individual vehicles and quartering places, now the creation of concentrated formations led by Russian officers, well organized and armed, is increasingly emerging, trying to subjugate entire areas and carry out combat missions on a larger scale. As a result, in many places power passes into the hands of the enemy.

The main areas of activity of the partisans are indicated in the attached map 1:1,000,000. In terms of organization, the movement has advanced most in the areas northwest and south of Bryansk, as well as south and southwest of Vyazma. Here, systematic interaction was established between regular landing units. The latter are the backbones of single compounds. equipment in Weapons and broken through or many areas are available in large quantities, so that it is

possible to create combat-ready formations. The growth of the partisan movement is characterized by the formation of headquarters, the recruitment and examination of conscripts, and systematic training. Realizing the weakness of our rear, the partisan movement seeks, first of all, to create a strong base in order to then block our communications and tactically interact with the Red Army by actions in the rear of the German front. The enemy provides communications through aircraft, agents and radio. The civilian population supports the movement voluntarily or under duress, and due to the general situation and as a result of our actions, voluntary assistance is increasingly expanding.

Insufficient propaganda influence, the absence of positive assurances in the economic and cultural fields, in contrast to the widely known appeals of Stalin, and also, not least, the poverty in which the population lives - all this intensifies resistance more and more in the entire rear area. Of our forces in the rear areas, in addition to the front-line units mentioned daily in the reports, for waging a fight against partisans,

guarding the railways, there are:

2 TA - approximately 12 weak companies, insufficiently equipped with heavy weapons and without artillery. 4 A - 2

guard and 3 gendarme companies. 4 TA - 1

guard battalion. Com. rear area -

15 rear guard battalions. Most of the guard forces were

transferred to the armies for use at the front. With these forces, one cannot think of an

active struggle against the partisans. In the following areas there are no security forces at all: the area south of the Roslavl-Bryansk highway,

the area south of the railway station. Roslavl-

Kirov village, Dorogobuzh district. There

are especially many

partisans in the following areas: a) the area between

Klintsy and Mglin, b) the Glusk area

(southwest of Bobruisk), c) the Krichev area, d)

the Cherven area.

The army group

headquarters hoped to remove the partisan danger as soon as the front was fortified. However, recent military events make this hope more and more unrealizable. In many sectors of the front of the army group, the Russians have shown unusual activity in recent days, so that all our forces were operating at full capacity and it was impossible to remove from the front the formations that were subordinate to the commander of the rear area and urgently needed by him - police, SS, security formations, construction connections and

etc.

The total strength of the army group, despite the incoming reinforcements as a result of losses incurred during

recent days, has declined. On the other hand, the combat power, and thus the audacity of the partisans and enemy units in our rear, is growing day by day. The activity of enemy aviation is also activated to the same extent, which supports the enemy's combat operations, inflicting more and more tangible damage on us. With such a development of the situation, the question

arises before the headquarters of the army group: will we be able to carry out the two planned offensive operations (southwest of Sukhinichi and northwest of Rzhev) before the onset of mudslides? Before the snow melts, it is necessary to clear the area at the junction of the 2nd Panzer and 4th Armies in order to prevent further infiltration of enemy units through the passage in the Kirov area into the Bryansk partisan region. In addition, this should remove the direct pressure of the enemy on

highway.

For an offensive against Ostashkov, it is necessary to clear the area southwest of Rzhev to the Nelidovo-Bely line and the Vyazma region, at least along the highway and the Vyazma-Yukhnov railway. The first is all the more necessary because the enemy pressure here is significantly increasing, today even a new enemy division has appeared here. Both tasks will take some time to complete, probably up to 14 days. It is doubtful that they will be resolved before the onset of mudslides. But even if this happens, I once again ask you to consider the question of the advisability of carrying out the planned offensive against Ostashkov under any circumstances before the onset of mudslides. If we take into account the almost 100-kilometer length of the communication line (Olenino-Ostashkov), then the task set by the present forces can hardly be solved. The breakthrough to Ostashkov itself might succeed, but in the future it would be extremely difficult to hold the new front line with the available forces against concentrated Russian attacks. Our supply route runs close to the front. If it is cut, all our forces operating north of the breakthrough site will find themselves in the most difficult conditions.

To carry out the necessary clearance of the rear area, the 2nd Panzer Army will need to use at least 1 division; 4th Army and 4th Tank Army, in addition to the already active formations (5

td, the remnants of the 10th and 11th tank and 106th infantry divisions), also the remnants of the

23rd infantry division. It is advisable to use the newly arriving 342nd Infantry Division to clear the rear area of enemy units located here. I would be extremely grateful if you would

request the Führer's decision on this matter.

***von Kluge***

TsAMO, f. 500, op. 12462, d. 525, l. 60–65. Translation from him.

**17. Report on the actions of the 20th Panzer Division from January 23 to March 13, 1942 [202]—**

**14.3.42**

***20th Panzer Division  
Division***

***Headquarters Operational Section, No. 231/42***

SECRET

Regarding: use of the 20th Panzer Division from 23.1 to 13.3.42. Link: telegram of the

20th Panzer Division, operational department No.

***To the headquarters of the 20th Army Corps Copy: Army Group "Center"***

1. During the period from January 23 to February 1, 1942, the 20th Panzer Division took over the defense of the southern flank of the 4th Panzer Army, while in a fierce battle it expanded the bridgehead fortification and occupies the position: Istra to the line Mal. Ivanovskoye-Bukari-Tulizovo and captured the village of Bukanovo. 2.2.2. and on 3.2.42, the 20th Panzer Division,

by attacking to the south, established contact between the 4th Panzer Army and the 4th [field] Army and cut off enemy units that had made their way to the west. In fierce battles, with big

losses, against the Russian 9th Guards Division, the enemy was driven back from the position of Maloye Ivanovskoye, Pinashino and Savino.

3. During the period from 4.2 to 26.2, the 20th Panzer Division in the area on both sides and north of Pinashino repulsed a large number of enemy attacks carried out by significantly superior forces of the formations of the Russian 33rd and 43rd armies and at the same time expanded the bridgehead to the 4th [field] army in heavy local battles to the Ugra River on both sides of the Prudka. Despite fierce tank-supported attacks, the Russians failed to re-establish lost contact with their cut-off divisions.

4. After the 20th Panzer Division on February 26, 1942, in its western sector, took up initial positions for an attack to the west, it turned east to eliminate the Russian breakthrough in the Grechishchenko area. Here, too, in stubborn battles, she managed to repulse the enemy's numerically superior attacks and prevent him from again uniting with the divisions that had broken through.

In these battles, only parts of the 20th Panzer Division repulsed many enemy attacks, many tanks were destroyed, prisoners and trophies were captured, as evidenced by the following data:

	с 23.1 по 1.2.42	с 2.2 по 3.2.42	с 4.2 по 26.2.42	после 26.2.42	Сумма
а) Атаки численностью свыше батальона почти исключительно с большой танковой поддержкой	4	1	26	34	65
б) Атаки противника численностью менее батальона	11		22	97	130
в) При этом уничтожено танков противника:					
частями дивизии	—	—	10	16	25
подчиненными войсками (88-мм зенитные пушки)			3	22	25
г) Частями 20-й танковой дивизии было взято в плен	37	41	184	134	396
д) Захвачены трофеи:					
орудий (76-мм и тяжелые пехотные пушки)	3	1	5		9
противотанковых пушек	2		—	3	5
тяжелых и легких минометов	1	1	5	5	12
четверенных пулеметов, тяжелых и легких пулеметов	9	18	47	1	75
Пехотные боеприпасы Млн. выстр.	5,3	—	—	—	5,3
Авиабомб	1200	—	—	—	1200
Большое количество ручного оружия и военного снабжения всякого рода					



	с 23.1 по 1.2.42	с 2.2 по 3.2.42	с 4.2 по 26.2.42	после 26.2.42	Сумма
е) Части 20-й танковой дивизии понесли следующие потери:*					
убитыми и пропавшими без вести	(6) 101	(3) 40	(9) 151	(7) 306	(25) 598
Ранеными	(5) 181	(3) 53	(29) 353	(14) 786	(51) 1373
Замерзшими и заболевшими <sup>1</sup>	(1) 173	(-) 40	(1) 841	(9) 674	(11) 1728
					(87) 3699

\* Figures in parentheses: including loss of officers.

<sup>1</sup> From this it can be judged that the losses of German troops sick and frostbitten in the battle of Moscow approximately corresponded to the losses of the wounded. According to the work of B. Müller-Hillebrand, the total losses of German troops frostbitten in the winter of 1941/42 amounted to 228,000 people, of which they returned to duty: after 3 months - 40%, 6 months - 70 %, in a year - 85 %. Of the remaining 5 % were commissioned and 10% were found to be limited fit for service in Germany. Mortality from frostbite was 1.55%, or 4340 people. In summary reports on the losses of German troops on the Eastern Front, these figures usually do not appear.

During the same period of time, only 1151 people were replenished, of which 8 were officers. The enemy suffered much greater losses during the same period of time.

For the division  
commander First officer of the General  
Staff (**signed**)

TsAMO, f. 500, op. 121 479, d. 1335, l. 49–52.

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# Notes

**1**

At that time, two of the commanders of the army groups were already field marshals. Fedor von Bock and Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb became field marshals on July 19, 1940. Gerd von Rundstedt was a colonel general. **(Ed. note)**

**2**

See Comment No. 1 (Appendix I).

**3**

See comment no. 2 (Appendix I).

**4**

See Comment No. 3 (Appendix I).

**5**

The size of "about a motorized division" was estimated by the 1st Panzer Division of the XXXXI Motorized Corps, which was the first to reach Kalinin. Later, the 6th Panzer and 36th Motorized Divisions joined it. **(Ed. note)**

**6**

See comment no. 4 (Appendix I).

**7**

See Comment No. 5 (Appendix I).

**8**

It should be borne in mind that the Tula direction at that time was not part of the Western Front. The 50th Army was included in the Western Front on November 10, 1941, and the following dividing line was established between the Western and Bryansk Fronts: Spassk-Ryazansky, Mikhailov, Uzlovaya Station, Krapivna, Belev, Dyatkovo (all inclusive of the Western Front).

## 9

"800-900 tanks" is still an overestimation of the strength of the German panzer divisions for this period. According to Thomas Jentz, the 6th Panzer Division on October 31 had 66 tanks combat-ready, the 1st Panzer Division - 36, the 10th Panzer Division on November 1 - 89 tanks. The entire 2nd Panzer Army had 150 combat-ready tanks. Another thing is that due to the repaired machines, this number could constantly change both in the direction of decrease and increase. **(Ed. note)**

## 10

From 23:00 on November 17, the 30th Army was included in the Western Front. The border with the Kalinin Front was established as follows: (excl.) Kashin, Negotino (10 km south of Kalinin), Staritsa, Rzhev.

eleven

49 divisions in total, rounding off three armored brigades as one division.

## 12

Only as part of the Western Front, without the aviation of the High Command and the Moscow air defense zone, but only about 600 active aircraft.

## 13

Report of the Military Council of the Western Front to Comrade Stalin on December 12, 1941 and the message of the Soviet Information Bureau of December 13, 1941.

## 14

By that time, the 3rd Panzer Group was commanded by Panzer General Georg-Hans Reinhardt (in office since October 5, 1941). Herman Goth was sent to command the 17th Army in Army Group South. **(Ed. note)**

## 15

The composition of the 2nd tank army of G. Guderian at that time included the XXXXVII motorized corps (18th tank division, 10th, 19th and 25th motorized divisions), LIII army corps (167th and 112th infantry divisions) and the XXIV Motorized Corps (3rd, 4th and 17th Panzer Divisions, 296th Infantry Division, Grossdeutschland Motorized Infantry Regiment). **(Ed. note)**

## 16

On the left wing of the Kalinin Front (30th Army), the German offensive began on November 15.

## 17

The 1st shock army was commanded by Lieutenant General V. I. Kuznetsov, the 10th Army (third formation) - Lieutenant General F. I. Golikov and the 20th Army (second formation) - Lieutenant General A. A. Vlasov . **(Ed. note)**

## 18

As noted above, from October 5, 1941, the 3rd tank the group was commanded by General of the Panzer Troops Reinhardt. **(Ed. note)**

## 19

The tank shock fist of the 4th Panzer Group at that time included the V Army Corps (2nd Panzer Division, 35th and 106th Infantry Divisions), XXXXVI Motorized Corps (5th and 11th Panzer Divisions), XXXX Motorized Corps (10th Panzer Division and SS Motorized Division "Das Reich"). The published work did not correctly reveal the subordination of the 4th Panzer Group of the IX and VII Army Corps as part of the 78th, 87th, 7th, 197th and 267th Infantry Divisions. **(Ed. note)**

## 20

From November 1, 1941, the 30th Army was commanded by Major General D.D. Lelyushenko. **(Ed. note)**

## 21

Ivan Evstafievich Dobrobabin remained in the occupied territory and returned to the Red Army only in the spring of 1944. In 1947 he was sentenced to 15 years for collaborating with the Germans and deprived of all awards (including those received in 1944-1945). In 1954 he was released, in 1993 he was finally rehabilitated. Died in 1996. **(Ed. note)**

## 22

In fact, not everyone died. Private Natarov died in the hospital (it was from his words that journalist A. Krivitsky described this story), six more survived until the end of the war. **(Ed. note)**

## 23

Before us is one of the early versions of the story of the 28 Panfilovites, which has not been confirmed by modern research. The 11th Panzer Division operating in the Dubosekovo area, according to the history of the formation, irretrievably lost only 9 tanks from the beginning of November to the 21st. But the inclusion of a propaganda episode in a serious study conveys well both the spirit of the time and the importance attached to these events. **(Ed. note)**

## 24

See Comment No. 7 (Appendix I).

## 25

For a description of these battles on the German side, see Appendix III. **(Ed. note)**

## 26

In the album of M. Kolomiets "Battle for Moscow. September 30 - December 5, 1941" ("Front illustration" No. 1-2002. KM Strategy, 2002. P. 44-45) it is indicated that on November 16 the division had 198 light tanks (BT, T-26, T-40 and T-60), of which 139 vehicles were lost in a counterattack on November 16 (on the right flank of the 16th Army). But below, in the work of B. M. Shaposhnikov, it is indicated that at the time of the transfer of the 30th Army on November 18 (more precisely, on the evening of the 17th), only 15 tanks remained in the division (which is incorrect), that is, the losses in the 16th Army amounted to 63 cars (which is generally true). Wed Comment No. 8. **(Ed. note)**

## 27

On November 20, the commander of the 58th Panzer Division, Major General Kotlyarov, shot himself, leaving a note with the following content: ***"General disorganization and loss of control. The higher headquarters are to blame. I don't want to be responsible for the mess. Retreat to Yamuga behind anti-tank obstacles, save Moscow ... Ahead without prospects. (Ed. note)***

## 28

See Comment No. 8 (Appendix I).

## 29

The 31st Tank Brigade was commanded by Colonel A. G. Kravchenko, who later headed the 6th Tank Army (since January 1944

until the end of the war), twice Hero of the Soviet Union. The effective actions of his brigade in the Klin-Solnechnogorsk operation were one of the first steps in the successful career of A. G. Kravchenko, who later went through Stalingrad, the Kursk Bulge and ended the war in Manchuria. **(Ed. note)**

thirty

By this time, the task force of General Zakharov left Klin and took up defense east of the city, with 1,500 people, 12 guns and 24 tanks. **(Ed. note)**

### 31

See Comment No. 9 (Appendix I).

### 32

See Comment No. 10 (Appendix I).

### 33

According to other sources, enemy losses amounted to 20 tanks and 800 soldiers and officers. **(Ed. note)**

### 34

More details about the concentration of reserve armies are given in the second chapter.

### 35

See Comment No. 11 (Appendix I).

### 36

That is, after heavy losses in tanks suffered during the counterattack on November 16–17. **(Ed. note)**



**37**

That is rocket artillery. *(Ed. note)*

**38**

See Comment No. 12 (Appendix I).

**39**

See Comment No. 13 (Appendix I).

**40**

The 478th regiment was not motorized. It was an ordinary infantry regiment from the 258th Infantry Division, but it really was given tanks and self-propelled guns "Sturmgeshyutz". *(Ed. note)*

**41**

As of December 1, the 136th tank battalion had 10 T-34s, 10 T-60s, 9 Valentines and 3 Matildas; on December 5, the 140th tank battalion had 4 KVs, 4 T-34s, 1 1 T-26. *(Ed. note)*

**42**

See Comment No. 14 (Appendix I).

**43**

At this point, in the 108th Panzer Division of Colonel S. A. Ivanov, there were about 30 vehicles (on September 27 - 41 tanks, of which 3 KV and 17 T-34). *(Ed. note)*

**44**

Now Novomoskovsk. *(Ed. note)*

**45**

The division "Grossdeutschland" ("Grossdeutschland") never belonged to the SS. Attributing it to the SS in Soviet sources, apparently, is associated with an unusual for the Wehrmacht "nominal" designation. **(Ed. note)**

## 46

The 18th Panzer Regiment belonged to the 18th Panzer Division. Actions it is not confirmed by German sources separately from the connection. **(Ed. note)**

## 47

37 mm mortar-shovel. **(Ed. note)**

## 48

The 413th division arrived from the Far Eastern Front. By order of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, she was sent to the Dedilovo area, the Uzlovaya station, Maklets and immediately entered the battle.

## 49

If the belonging of "Grossdeutschland" to the SS troops is a mistake, then the organization of the regiment in five battalions is true. In addition to five infantry battalions, an artillery division, a Sturmgeshtz self-propelled gun company and auxiliary units were subordinate to him. **(Ed. note)**

## 50

On November 16, that is, at the end of the strike, the 112th Panzer Division of Colonel A.L. Getman consisted of 3 KV tanks, 11 T-34 tanks and 12 light vehicles. **(Ed. note)**

## 51

The division was formed on the basis of the 47th reserve regiment in the Balashov area and from the Stavka reserve was transferred to the Western Front.

## 52

On this day, the advanced units of the German 17th Panzer Division went to the southern outskirts of Kashira. **(Ed. note)**

## 53

The 63rd and 40th motorized infantry regiments were part of the 17th Panzer Division. **(Ed. note)**

## 54

See Comment No. 15 (Appendix I).

## 55

See Comment No. 16 (Appendix I).

## 56

Order of the headquarters of the Moscow defense zone No. 23 of November 29.

## 57

The 60th Army was formed according to the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of November 2, 1941. Subsequently, it was renamed the 3rd Shock Army, was transferred to the North-Western Front and took part in the Toropetsko-Kholm'skaya operation. **(Ed. note)**

## 58

The 24th Army in the winter of 1941-1942 remained a reserve formation, and on April 26, 1941 it was renamed the 1st Reserve Army. **(Ed. note)**

## 59

See Comment No. 17 (Appendix I).

## 60

See Comment No. 18 (Appendix I).

## 61

In this case, the transfer of efforts from one sector of the front to another becomes more difficult, the organization of interaction between separately advancing groups of troops becomes more difficult, etc. **(Ed. note)**

## 62

In this total count, three rifle brigades are taken as one rifle division. **(Ed. note)**

## 63

Equating approximately three tank battalions to one tank brigade, and three tank brigades to one tank division. **(Ed. note)**

## 64

As of December 1, 1941, there were about 520,000 people in combat units and formations of the Western Front (excluding support troops and logistics institutions of the armies and the front). **(Ed. note)**

## 65

When comparing the grouping of forces on both sides, it is necessary note the following. 1.

The 30th Army occupied an advantageous operational position in relation to the main enemy grouping operating against the 20th and 16th armies, as it hung over its left flank and rear and threatened to strike in the direction of Klin and further south and cut thus the communications of the 3rd and 4th tank groups already upset in previous battles. 2. The concentration of a dense

grouping of the 1st shock army on a front of 30 km and the right-flank units of the 20th army on a front of 10-12 km gave an average operational density of about 5 km per

rifle division. Such a density should be recognized as quite favorable for an offensive operation.

In terms of saturation with technology, the most provided was section of the 16th Army. **(Ed. note)**

## 66

Note that the authors of the book tactfully omitted the name of the commander of the 20th Army - A. A. Vlasov. In 1943, it became known about Vlasov's betrayal, and even his quite successful actions began to be hushed up. **(Ed. note)**

## 67

The 240th motorized regiment was not part of the German troops in this direction. Most likely, we are talking about the 240th Infantry Regiment of the 106th Infantry Division. **(Ed. note)**

## 68

See Comment No. 19 (Appendix I).

## 69

The 900th brigade did not belong to the SS troops. It was a training motorized unit formed on July 17, 1941. Von Bock, in his diary entry of 4 December, rates it as a "reinforced battalion". **(Ed. note)**

## 70

See Comment No. 20 (Appendix I).

## 71

More precisely, motorized infantry ("Das Reich" by Paul Hausser). SS formations in 1941 were motorized, with the exception of the infantry division of the 4th Infantry Division of the SS "Policeman" formed according to the states. **(Ed. note)**

## 72

In total (together with the 1st shock and 20th armies) rifle divisions - 8, cavalry divisions - 3, rifle brigades - 15, artillery regiments - 9, as well as several other units.

## 73

There were no losses from aviation due to the fact that the tanks were painted white.

## 74

The Dovator Corps received the Guards name on November 27, 1941. The 50th Cavalry Division became the 3rd Guards Cavalry Division and the 53rd Cavalry Division became the 4th Guards Cavalry Division. **(Ed. note)**

## 75

See Comment No. 21 (Appendix I).

## 76

Lev Mikhailovich Dovator received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union posthumously by Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of December 21, 1941. **(Ed. note)**

## 77

Quoted from the description of the headquarters of the Western Front "The defeat of the Germans near Moscow."

## 78

The ratio in the number of personnel, in tanks and mortars is shown in the general table of the balance of forces on the Western Front by December 6, 1941.

## 79

File of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff No. 132 s / s, l. 167.

## 80

The name "tank division" in this case is a convention - in December, the 112th tank division of A.L. Getman was transformed into the 112th tank brigade. **(Ed. note)**

## 81

December 10 was subordinated to the 49th Army and acted as part of it in the Aleksin direction.

## 82

See Comment No. 22 (Appendix I).

## 83

Case of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff on the Western Front No. 130 s / s.

## 84

These data correspond to reality, but refer to the period from June 22 to December 6, 1941. According to the official history of the "Grossdeutschland" division, written by Helmut Shpeter, from 06/22/1941 to 12/6/1941 the regiment lost 735 people killed, 2590 wounded and 110 people missing, i.e. 4070 people, which generally coincides with the testimony of prisoners . **(Ed. note)**

## 85

In addition, as mentioned above, the 340th and 173rd rifle divisions were transferred from the 50th Army to the 49th Army, of which the first was later again subordinated to the commander of the 50th Army.

## **86**

It was transferred from the 1st Army, from Solnechnogorsk.

## **87**

All brigades were transferred to the 49th Army from the reserve of the High Command and from other sectors of the front.

## **88**

An excerpt from the directive is taken from the "Journal of military operations Western Front for December 1941", p. 89.

## **89**

Intelligence report of the headquarters of the Western Front No. 210 of December 19, 1941 of the year.

## **90**

Details about the occupation of the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps Odoev is said in the description of the Belevsko-Kozelskaya operation.

## **91**

Apparently, the rear of this division; other parts of it by this time were in the sector of the 49th Army and in the Przemysl region.

## **92**

In the directive of the front commander of December 20, all three cavalry divisions (as well as the 322nd and 328th rifle divisions) are mentioned as attached to the cavalry corps, but their actual incorporation into the group of General Belov was carried out only during this period (December 23).

## **93**



It should be noted that in the battles for Kaluga, the German command made extensive use of the airlift of troops. From December 20 to December 26, 1941, 8512 replenishment people were transferred to the Kaluga region by transport aviation. (**Ed. note**)

**94**

See Comment No. 23 (Appendix I).

**95**

See Comment No. 24 (Appendix I).

**96**

See Comment No. 25 (Appendix I).

**97**

See table 3 in the first book (part III).

**98**

See Comment No. 26 (Appendix I).

**99**

According to the German historian Rüdiger Overmans, the loss of German troops killed on the entire Soviet-German front in December 1941 amounted to 40,198 people. According to Werner Haupt, the loss of the GA "Center" by the wounded, killed and missing in December 1941 amounted to 103,600 people. (**Ed. note**)

**100**

From the order of the commander of the 23rd Infantry Division.

**101**

See Comment No. 27 (Appendix I).

**102**

See Comment No. 28 (Appendix I).

**103**

See Comment No. 29 (Appendix I).

**104**

See Comment No. 30 (Appendix I).

**105**

See Comment No. 31 (Appendix I).

**106**

On December 22, the dividing line between Kalininsky and Western fronts were held from Kotlyakovo to Sychevka.

**107**

This refers to the division "Das Reich". (*Ed. note*)

**108**

See Comment No. 32 (Appendix I).

**109**

Army Order No. 01/op dated January 3, 1942.

**110**

On January 6, 1942, the latter was renamed the 12th Guards.

**111**

See Comment No. 33 (Appendix I).

## 112

See Comment No. 34 (Appendix i).

## 113

Now there are certain disagreements about the authorship of the artillery attack on Lama, which is included in the textbooks. Sometimes it is attributed to the commander of the 20th Army, A.A. Vlasov, but the given order gives an unequivocal answer: the author of the decision to concentrate forces in the 20th Army zone is G.K. Zhukov. (**Ed. note**)

## 114

The organizational structure of the army is indicated in Appendix II.

## 115

Two regiments of the 6th Panzer Division, which acted as an infantry division, and one regiment of the 35th Infantry Division, which was the main force against the fettering army group - the 28th and 35th rifle brigades.

## 116

The 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps, which operated on Sereda, the Remizov and Katukov groups, the 352nd Rifle Division, the 64th Rifle Brigade and, in addition, the 28th Rifle Brigade, which was transferred to Volokolamsk for staffing and subsequently followed the right flank in the second echelon.

## 117

See Comment No. 35 (Appendix I).

## 118

See Comment No. 36 (Appendix I).

## **119**

That is, to Vyazma.

## **120**

Data on their troops are given based on materials from the headquarters of the Western Front (case No. 14 for 1941).

## **121**

By January 26, the 19th Infantry Brigade was also subordinated.

## **122**

By decision of the Military Council of the 50th Army, the 112th Panzer Division, due to its small number, was transformed into the 112th Tank Brigade.

## **123**

The former 31st Cavalry Division, simultaneously with the 258th Rifle Division, was renamed the 7th Guards Cavalry Division.

## **124**

Former 9th Tank Brigade, renamed January 6, 1942 as the 2nd Guards Tank Brigade.

## **125**

It was formed in the Syzran region, completed its formation in the Kuibyshev region, Cheboksary, Chuvash ASSR and arrived in the Krasnaya Pakhra region, from where, by order of the Headquarters, it was transferred on January 16 to the 50th Army; finished concentration on January 22.

## **126**

Yukhnov was occupied by Soviet troops only in March 1942. **(Ed. note)**

## 127

See Comment No. 37 (Appendix I).

## 128

The “von Gilza group” defending Sukhinichi (named after the commander of the 216th Infantry Division, Major General von Gilza) consisted of 3 artillery batteries and 6 infantry battalions - two battalions of the 216th division, one battalion of the 403rd security division, one battalion of the 56th Infantry Division, marching and construction battalions. **(Ed. note)**

## 129

24th Tank Corps of the 2nd Tank Army. **(Ed. note)**

## 130

German troops released Sukhinichi on January 24, and on January 28 they finally left the city. **(Ed. note)**

## 131

This count is wrong. The 5th airborne corps alone, which had not previously participated in the battles, numbered 9,000 people, most of whom were combat personnel. **(Ed. note)**

## 132

Initially, the 250th airborne regiment, consisting of 1300 people (landing assault) and two parachute detachments of 202 and 348 people each, were supposed to participate in the operation, which ensured the capture and retention of the airfield near Bolshoy Fatyanov - 5 km east of Myatlevo, on the western coast the Shan River. **(Ed. note)**

## 133

Major Starchak's detachment completed the task, capturing the airfield near Bolshoi Fatyanov, but the landing was canceled, and the paratroopers were ordered to act independently as a sabotage detachment. See: I. G. Starchak. From the sky - into battle. M.: Military Publishing House, 1965. **(Ed.)**

## 134

Partisan detachment of A. A. Petrukhin. **(Ed. note)**

## 135

This refers to the 8th airborne brigade of the 4th airborne corps, landed in the Ozerechnya area (50 km west of Vyazma). The ejection of the brigade began on the night of January 27-28 and continued until February 2. The landing of the remaining units of the 4th VDK was carried out in the same area from February 17 to 24. See Appendix II. **(Ed. note)**

## 136

On the same day, units of the German 4th Army of General Heinrici and the 4th Panzer Army of General Ruof, united in the area of the Shan plant, cut off the army's strike force from its main forces. The 113th, 160th and 338th rifle divisions with the headquarters of the 33rd army were surrounded. **(Ed. note)**

## 137

For a description of the battles of the 33rd Army for Vyazma, see Appendix II. **(Ed. note)**

## 138

Road maintenance regiments, with the exception of one, were two-battalion composition.

## **139**

Halder F. Military diary. Daily notes of the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces. Volume 3. Book One, Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1971, p. 388.

## **140**

There is a third source of information about the losses of the Wehrmacht in the summer and autumn of 1941: B. Müller-Hillebrand. Land Army of Germany, 1933–1945. Volume III. M.: Voenizdat, 1976. Here (on p. 17) it is indicated that from June 22 to the end of November 1941, the total losses of the Wehrmacht in the East amounted to about 740,000 people, of which 244,000 were irretrievable.

## **141**

According to Müller-Hillebrand (volume III, p. 19), from June to November 1941, 2251 tanks and 295 assault guns were lost on all fronts (that is, taking into account North Africa).

## **142**

Compiled by: Haupt W. Assault on Moscow. 1941. The Offensive. The Battle. The Set Back. Schiffer Military History, Atglen, PA, 1996, p.71.

## **143**

IN AND. Dashichev Bankruptcy strategy of German fascism. Volume 2 Moscow: Nauka, 1973, p. 242.

## **144**

Ibid., p. 248.

## **145**

This refers to the road Smolensk-Moscow.

## **146**

Haupt W. Assault on Moscow. 1941. The Offensive. The Battle. The Setback. Schiffer Military History, Atglen, PA, 1996, p. 76.

## **147**

Haupt W. Op.cit., p. 88.

## **148**

Dashichev V.I. Decree. cit., p. 256.

## **149**

Bock F. von. The war diary. 1939–1945 Edited by Klaus Gerbert. Schiffer Military History. Atglen, PA, 1996, p. 336.

## **150**

Modern official figures for the total losses of the Western, Reserve, Bryansk and Kalinin fronts for the period from October 2 to December 5 are 658,279 people. See: Russia and the USSR in the wars of the twentieth century. Losses of the armed forces. M.: OLMA-Press, 2001, p. 273.

## **151**

K. Reinhardt. Turn near Moscow. The collapse of Hitler's strategy in the winter of 1941/42. Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1980, pp. 361–362.

## **152**

M. Kolomiets. Battle for Moscow. September 30 - December 5, 1941 ("Front illustration" No. 1-2002). KM strategy, 2002, p. 45.

## **153**

Commander of the 4th Army.

## **154**



Bock F. von. The war diary. 1939–1945 Edited by Klaus Gerbert.  
Schiffer Military History. Atglen, PA, 1996, p. 360.

## **155**

Ibid, p. 361.

## **156**

Ibid, p. 363.

## **157**

K. K. Rokossovsky. Soldier duty. Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1988, pp. 80–82.

## **158**

The division was transferred from the 4th to the 3rd TGr by order of the command  
GA "Center" December 3, 1941.

## **159**

Bock F. von. Op. cit., p. 381.

## **160**

Bock F. von. Op. cit., p. 371.

## **161**

pflanz h. geschichte der 258.infanterie division. kurt vowinkel verlag. neckargemund,  
1978. s. 192.

## **162**

Bock F. von. Op. cit., p. 393.

## **163**

G. Guderian. Memoirs of a soldier. Smolensk: Rusich, 1999, pp. 355–356.

## **164**

Russian archive. The Great Patriotic War. T. 15 (4–1). M.: Terra, 1997, p. 215.

## **165**

Russian archive. The Great Patriotic War. T. 15 (4–1). M.: Terra, 1997, p. 215

## **166**

Ibid., p. 218.

## **167**

Belov P.A. Moscow is behind us. M.: Military Publishing House, 1963, p.168.

## **168**

Russian archive. The Great Patriotic War. T. 15 (4–1). M.: Terra, 1997, p. 235.

## **169**

Published by: collection of materials on the study of the experience of war. Issue 5. M.: Military Publishing House, 1943. Pp. 21–42.

## **170**

Order No. 055/op dated February 3, 1942

## **171**

In total, 2323 people were thrown out of the 8th airborne brigade (according to other sources - 2497), of which only 1320 gathered at the landing site. **(Ed.)**

## 172

It was a battalion from the 214th airborne brigade (293 people), dropped on the night of February 17 (according to other sources, on February 18) from 20 TB-3 aircraft. **(Ed. note)**

## 173

Published by: collection of materials on the study of the experience of war. Issue 5. M.: Military Publishing House, 1943. Pp. 43–58.

## 174

In some documents it is called a regiment. It was created on the basis of the battalion of Major V.V. Zhabot, in the first days of February 1942, sent to the German rear with a special assignment from the command of the Western Front. **(Ed. note)**

## 175

TsAMO, f. 8, op. 11 627, d. 1509, l. 1–15. Published by: Military Historical Archive. Issue. 3. M., 1998, pp. 125–160. The report was compiled in May-June 1942 by a group of operators of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army under the leadership of Colonel K. F. Vasilchenko. The text of the report has been slightly edited.

## 176

In the publication of the "Military Historical Archive" - "Western". Obviously this is a mistake.

## 177

In the publication of the "Military Historical Archive" this recommendation is commented as "controversial". Meanwhile, it is quite obvious that attempts to break through the encirclement from the eastern side - in the immediate vicinity of the positions of the 43rd and 49th armies, where a powerful enemy grouping was already concentrated - gave the Germans the opportunity to maneuver their forces on a small

space, directing them now against the outer, then against the inner front of the encirclement. All this was aggravated by the disgusting organization of interaction among the Soviet troops, well described above. At the same time, from the west, the grouping of German troops was much weaker, and in the area of operation of the Belov group, the enemy forces were generally small and scattered, which is well shown in the two previous works. The example of the 329th Rifle Division shows that the connection of the remaining encircled units of the 33rd Army with the Belov group allowed the latter to more effectively (and with fewer losses!) Perform its tasks. (**Ed. note**)

### **178**

TsAMO, f. 8, op. 11 627, d. 1509, l. 60–65. Published by: Military historical archive. Issue. 3. M., 1998, pp. 160–167.

### **179**

Published by: Russian archive. The Great Patriotic War. T. 15 (4–1). Moscow: Terra, 1997, pp. 58–59.

### **180**

Published by: Military Historical Archive. Issue. 3. M., 1998, pp. 85–87. The link to the archive in the publication is missing.

### **181**

Not shown.

### **182**

That is, with the 11th cavalry corps from the Kalinin Front, advancing on Vyazma from the north.

### **183**

Russian archive. The Great Patriotic War. T. 15 (4–1). M.: Terra, 1997, p. 333.

## **184**

Russian archive. The Great Patriotic War. T. 15 (4–1). M.: Terra, 1997, p. 334.

## **185**

Russian archive. The Great Patriotic War. T. 15 (4–1). M.: Terra, 1997, pp. 340–341.

## **186**

Russian archive. The Great Patriotic War. T. 15 (4–1). M.: Terra, 1997, p. 341.

## **187**

Russian archive. The Great Patriotic War. T. 15 (4–1). M.: Terra, 1997, p. 342.

## **188**

Published by: Military Historical Archive. Issue. 3. M., 1998, pp. 108–110. Also published in: Russian archive. The Great Patriotic War. T. 15 (4–1). M.: Terra, 1997, p. 343.

## **189**

Published by: Military Historical Archive. Issue. 3. M., 1998, pp. 111–112.

## **190**

Russian archive. The Great Patriotic War. T. 15 (4–1). M.: Terra, 1997, pp. 347–348.

## **191**

Russian archive. The Great Patriotic War. T. 15 (4–1). M.: Terra, 1997, p. 23.

## **192**

Russian archive. The Great Patriotic War. T. 15 (4–1). M.: Terra, 1997, p. 210.

## **193**

Russian archive. The Great Patriotic War. T. 15 (4–1). M.: Terra, 1997, p. 357.

## **194**

There is no signature on the document.

## **195**

Russian archive. The Great Patriotic War. T. 15 (4–1). Moscow: Terra, 1997, pp. 357–358.

## **196**

Published by: Military Historical Archive. Issue. 3. M., 1998, pp. 104–106.

## **197**

Colonel N.V. Gorin commanded the 82nd Cavalry Division.

## **198**

I mean KV-2. At that moment, there were no such vehicles in the Red Army, but the Germans called "KV" almost any Soviet tank that seemed large to them.

## **199**

8th Airborne Brigade of Colonel A. A. Onufriev.

## **200**

Russian archive. The Great Patriotic War. T. 15 (4–1). Moscow: Terra, 1997, pp. 384–386.

**201**

Error in translation. Should be eliminated.

**202**

Published by: Military Historical Archive. Issue. 3. M., 1998, pp. 106–108.